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TITLE.

System Safety Analytical Technology -

Preliminary Hazard Analysis

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Abstract and Key Words

This document describes the method for performing a Preliminary Hazard Analysis (also known as a Gross Hazard Analysis) and using the derived results. This analysis is a method for identifying hazardous elements, hazardous conditions, and potential accidents; determining the significance of their potential effect; and establishing initial design and procedural safety requirements to eliminate or control these identified hazardous conditions and potential accidents. The data and information thereby derived can be used to serve other initial system safety needs, such as prediction, planning, and priority allocation.

System safety
Hazardous element
Hazardous condition
Accident - Potential
Accident prevention measures
Safety analysis

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1.0 PURPOSE

The Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) is a method of system/subsystem/function analysis, developed and used by system safety engineering. The primary purposes of this analysis technique are to:

- 1) identify hazardous elements, hazardous conditions, and potential accidents
- 2) determine the significance of their potential effect
- 3) establish initial design and procedural safety requirements to eliminate or control these identified hazardous conditions and potential accidents.

In addition, the data and information derived from this analysis will serve other initial system safety needs, such as:

- 1) foresee hardware, procedural, and system interface problem areas
- 2) provide information that will assist in planning a safety program
- 3) provide visibility to management for safety program manloading and costing
- 4) establish priority for safety effort scheduling
- 5) identify areas for testing
- 6) identify areas for further analysis, particularly undesired events for fault tree analysis.

The PHA should be performed as early in the product program as possible, preferably during the conceptual stage, with scheduled updates as design development progresses. This provides the basis for the establishment of design safety requirements early in the program; thus, ideally, eliminating the possibility of design changes later in the program, which would be very costly.

The PHA can be initiated during any stage of product development with satisfactory usefulness. If the safety program commences at the conceptual phase of product development, initial safety requirements can be established from the PHA. If the safety program commences at some other stage of product development (i.e., Manufacturing), initial safety requirements cannot be established, and possible design changes may be imminent. However, whenever the safety program commences, the first analysis conducted should be a PHA. This is because, in identifying safety critical areas, the PHA also provides necessary information for planning and implementing the ensuing safety program.

In establishing initial safety requirements, the PHA is a means of investigating related program experience to determine what pitfalls have already been experienced in similar designs and what controls have been found necessary.

The name given to the PHA is somewhat misleading. Since the PHA is usually always the first safety analysis performed in a system safety program (or at least it should be), it has thus derived its name from being the initial or "preliminary" analysis. However, as the PHA is updated during the program, it still retains the "preliminary" in its name. Therefore, the information contained in the PHA should not be thought of as being preliminary in nature, but as broad and not detailed,

2.0 RESULTS

The results of the PHA are the documentation of the recognized and anticipated design safety pitfalls and the method by which these pitfalls are to be avoided. The methods of avoiding such pitfalls generally include:

- 1) establishing preventive measures
 - a) Initial safety requirements design, procedural, personnel
 - b) safety devices
 - c) design changes
- 2) identifying areas requiring further investigation
 - a) areas for further safety analysis and type of analysis
 - b) areas requiring testing
 - c) areas requiring trade studies
- 3) identifying applicable documents and standards.

In establishing requirements as preventive measures, the work does not always need to be original. In many areas of safety concern, design safety data already exists. This data is contained in applicable documents in the form of standards, criteria, specifications, requirements, and guidelines. Safety design data documents should be researched by the safety engineer, all applicable documents should be identified, and applicable safety portions specified, so that the designer knows exactly what is required. All applicable documents must be specified in order to avoid guess work with regard to what documents are applicable. If a mission requirement prevents the use of established safety design data, the PHA should reveal why they can't be used and show what design data will be applied to accomplish the intent of the established design data, or what customer waivers will be necessary.

The results of the PHA are used by both design and system safety engineering. Design engineering uses the results in their decision making process, to ensure an optimum safe design. In some respects the safety requirements serve as guidelines and/or constraints, from within which the designer must operate. Safety engineering uses the results as a safety baseline, from which the safety of future designs can be compared. In addition, the results provide a "road map" for follow-on safety studies, analyses, and testing.

3.0 METHODOLOGY

3.1 Basic Approach

The particular approach used in the accomplishment of the PHA is dependent upon such variables as funding, available time, and product sophistication. The documentary format of each approach is, in itself, a method of performing the analysis. To date, three acceptable approaches, and their related formats, are in existence. Commonly, they can be identified as:

- 1) columnar form with specific entries
- 2) top level fault tree
- 3) narrative description.

Although these approaches differ considerably, the basic content of their formats is very similar. That is, each approach results in the identification of hazardous conditions and potential accidents, with their related probable causes and potential effects. Primarily, the major difference between these approaches is the rigor of the method, the amount of information generated, and the overall usefulness of the information generated by the analysis.

The PHA approach utilizing the columnar form, with specific detailed entries in each column, appears to provide the optimum results for most programs. This format establishes a means for systematically scarching and recording specific hazard information with regard to systems, and storing this information so that it is easily retrievable and usable. It is a cost effective approach, in that it is not time consuming to perform. This method is particularly desirable because it provides superior program visibility, in addition to fulfilling the primary purpose of the PHA.

A top level fault tree, following the mechanics of fault tree analysis, fulfills the primary objective of a PHA. Although this analysis approach provides a systematic method of identifying hazardous conditions and potential accidents, it applies itself more readily to identifying the causes of these undesired events. Structuring the top level of a fault tree is generally the most difficult and time consuming phase of a fault tree analysis. Furthermore, although the fault tree is developed by graphically analyzing undesired events, it is sometimes difficult to specifically identify a particular event as a hazardous condition, a hazardous element, or a potential accident.

The narrative approach to the PHA is less rigorous, and usually less complete than the other two approaches, because to be equally detailed in a narrative writing style is a lengthy and backbreaking task. This approach is less susceptible to systematic method or technique, and, therefore, the results usually have serious gaps or incomplete areas. The hazardous conditions and potential accidents are

generally identified from experience, and then are explained in great depth and detail, more on the order of a final report than an analysis.

3.2 Approach

Using the columnar format, a PHA is initiated by dividing the system into convenient working sections, a working section being a subsystem, function, or any other logical system element which is small and easy to work. Each working section is investigated individually, and all hazardous elements existing in or associated with the design of that working section are identified. Then a determination is qualitatively made as to what is "risked" (i.e., personnel, hardware, mission) due to the hazardous element being present in the system. Needless to say, the item must be of appreciable "value" in order for it to sustain a risk or be in jeopardy. By determining how the hazardous element causes the risk to the item of value, the hazardous condition is indirectly identified. For example, hydrazine places a risk upon personnel during handling operations. The risk to the personnel could be due to toxic vapors. Therefore, a potential accident is established as "exposure of personnel to toxic vapors" and the associated hazardous condition is then identified as "unconfined hydrazine in the presence of personnel."

Now, the logical question is how to determine the hazardous elements. A hazardous element is any item or function which, when in a system environment, constitutes a threat or jeopardizes something of value, within or related to that system. The item or function may be inherently hazardous by itself, such as radioactive material, or it may be hazardous only when in combination with other items and/or functions, such as heat producing components. The key idea behind a hazardous element is that some value is being risked by having that element present in the system. Essentially, there are four methods for identifying hazardous elements: 1) through the use of checklists, 2) from experience, 3) engineering judgment, and 4) intuition.

Hazardous elements can be recognized through checklists by comparing the hardware elements or functions contained in the system design against the known hazardous elements on the checklist. There are many different checklists existing, as the following examples indicate:

- 1) general hazardous element sources (Figure 3-1)
- 2) hazardous energy sources (Figure 3-2)
- 3) hazardous acquisition functions (Figure 3-3)
- 4) hazardous mission functions (Figure 3-4)

Hardware elements or functions which correlate with items on a checklist indicate a safety critical area or a hazardous element. However, such a checklist is more than just a list with which to check off the system design, it is a list which is intended to stimulate ideas as to how or where an unrealized hazardous element could exist.

Experience from related programs provides information for identifying hazardous elements and safety critical areas. Previous safety problem areas encountered on similar hardware elements or functions which are presently being considered will indicate areas requiring special attention. The major problem here is that safety data retention centers are still maturing and all needed information may not be readily accessible. When such is the case, further identification of hazardous elements, not already encountered by way of checklists or experience, is accomplished through engineering judgment and/or intuition.

3.3 Hazardous Element Checklists

Since no single checklist is ever really adequate in itself, it becomes necessary to develop and utilize several checklists. Even though this will result in some repetition, complete coverage of hazardous elements will be more certain. Special checklists should be developed for the specialized needs of different programs, such as space programs, missile programs, aircraft programs, marine programs, etc. With the invention and usage of new hardware elements and functions, new hazardous elements will develop, requiring expanded and updated checklists.

The following are typical checklists used in recognizing hazardous elements and safety critical areas. These checklists, which are examples and are not intended to represent ultimate checklist sources, are as follows:

Figure 3-1 is a list of general sources which have been found to produce hazardous conditions and potential accidents, when the proper system conditions are present. This list should stimulate ideas as to where possible hazardous elements could exist in any particular system.

Figure 3-2 is a list of energy sources which are considered to be in themselves hazardous elements when used in a system environment. This is due to the potential effects from an energy source, should it be released within the system.

Figure 3-3 is a list of functions which are hazardous due to the materials used or to the critical nature of the operation. This list generally applies to programs in the acquisition phase, which includes manufacture, test, handling, transportation, and installation.

Figure 3-4 is a list of functions which are hazardous due to the materials used or to the critical nature of the mission. This list is an example particularly intended for space programs.

- 1. Acceleration
- 2. Contamination
- 3. Corrosion
- 4. Chemical dissociation
- 5. Electrical

shock

thermal

inadvertent activation

power source failure

electromagnetic radiation

- 6. Explosion
- 7. Fire
- 8. Heat and temperature

high temp

low temp

temp. variations

- 9. Leakage
- 10. Moisture

high humidity

low humidity

- 11. Oxidation
- 12. Pressure

high

low

rapid changes

13. Radiation

thermal

electromagnetic

ionizing

ultraviolet

- 14. Chemical replacement
- 15. Shock (mechanical)
- 16. Stress concentrations
- 17. Stress reversals
- 18. Structural damage or failure
- 19. Toxicity
- 20. Vibration and noise
- 21. Weather and environment

Figure 3-1 Checklist of General Hazardous Element Sources

- 1. Fuels
- 2. Propellants
- 3. Initiators
- 4. Explosive charges
- 5. Charged electrical capacitors
- 6. Storage batteries
- 7. Static electrical charges
- 8. Pressure containers
- 9. Spring-loaded devices
- 10. Suspension systems
- 11. Gas generators
- 12. Electrical generators
- 13. R. F. energy sources
- 14. Radioactive energy sources
- 15. Falling objects
- 16. Catapulted objects
- 17. Heating devices
- 18. Pumps, blowers, fans
- 19. Rotating machinery
- 20. Actuating devices
- 21. Nuclear

Figure 3-2 Checklist of Hazardous Energy Sources

- 1. Welding
- 2. Cleaning
- 3. Extreme temperature operations
- 4. Extreme weight operations
- 5. Hoisting, handling, and assembly operations
- 6. Test chamber operations
- 7. Proof test of major components/subsystems/systems
- 8. Propellant loading/transfer/handling
- 9. High energy pressurization/hydrostatic-pneumostatic testing
- 10. Nuclear component handling/checkout
- 11. Ordnance installation/checkout/test
- 12. Tank entry/confined space entry
- 13. Transport and handling of end item
- 14. Manned vehicle tests
- 15. Static firing
- 16. Systems operational validations

Figure 3-3 Checklist of Hazardous Acquisition Functions

- 1. Crew egress/ingress
- 2. Ground to stage power transfer
- 3. Launch escape
- 4. Stage firing and separation
- 5. Ground control communication transfer
- 6. Rendezvous and docking
- 7. Ground control of crew
- 8. Ground data communication to crew
- 9. Extra vehicular activity
- 10. In-flight tests by crew
- 11. In-flight emergencies involving loss of communications, loss of power/control, fire toxicity, explosion, or life support system
- 12. Re-cntry
- 13. Parachute deployment and descent
- 14. Crew recovery
- 15. Vehicle safing and recovery
- 16. Vehicle inerting and decontamination
- 17. Payload mating
- 18. Fairing separation
- 19. Orbital injection
- 20. Solar panel deployment
- 21. Orbit positioning
- 22. Orbit correction
- 23. Data acquisition
- 24. Mid-course correction
- 25. Star acquisition (navigation)
- 26. On-orbit performance
- 27. Retro-thrust

Figure 3-4 Checklist of Hazardous Mission Functions

3.4 Technique

The recommended columnar PHA format is shown in Figure 3-5. This particular format has proven to be useful and effective in applied situations. As shown, this format provides for entries identifying hazardous elements and conditions, resulting potential accidents and their causes and effects, accident prevention measures to correct the situation, and design engineering feedback.

The following instructions are descriptive of the information required under each column entry of the form:

- Subsystem or Function This column identifies the hardware or functional element being analyzed.
- 2) Mode This column identifies the system phases or modes of operation which are applicable.
- 3) Hazardous Element This column identifies the elements, in the hardware or function being analyzed, which are inherently hazardous.
- 4) Event Causing Hazardous Condition This column identifies conditions, undesired events, or faults which could cause (or trigger) the hazardous element to become the identified hazardous condition.
- 5) Hazardous Condition This column identifies the hazardous conditions which could result from the interaction of the system and each hazardous element in the system.
- 6) Event Causing Potential Accident This column identifies undesired events, or faults which could cause (trigger) the hazardous condition into becoming the identified potential accident.
- 7) Potential Accident This column identifies any potential accidents which could result from the identified hazardous conditions.
- 8) Effect This column identifies the possible effects of the potential accident, should it occur.
- 9) Hazard Classification This column provides a qualitative measure of significance for the potential effect of each identified hazardous condition, according to the following criteria:
 - Class I SAFE Condition(s) such that personnel error, deficiency/
 inadequacy of design, or malfunction will not result in major
 degradation and will not produce equipment damage or
 personnel injury.

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ORES	10A3 PERSONNEL	.:	m3. D2-113072-1
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ACCIDENT PREV	HARDWARE		·
9 10 HAZ.	CLASS 10A1		
H Lyanaa			MATRIXPRÉLIMINARY HAZARD ANALTSIS
	ACCIDENT		ELIMINARY IIA
* EVENT CAUSING	POTENTIAL ACCIDENT		MATRD:PRÌ
S RAZARDOUS	CONDITION		
EVENT CAUSING	HAZARDOUS CONDITION		
HAZARDOUS	ELEMENT		
300W		·	·
I SURSTSTEM OR	FUNCTION	,	אנא נוש

Figure 3-5

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- Class II MARGINAL Condition(s) such that personnel error.

 deficiency/inadequacy of design, or malfunction will degrade
 performance, but which can be counteracted or controlled
 without major damage or any injury to personnel.
- Class III CRITICAL Condition(s) such that personnel error, deficiency/inadequacy of design, or malfunction will degrade performance, injure personnel, damage equipment or will result in a hazard requiring immediate corrective action for personnel or equipment survival.
- Class IV CATASTROPHIC Condition(s) such that personnel error, deficiency/inadequacy of design, or mulfunction will severely degrade performance and cause subsequent equipment loss and/or death or multiple injuries to personnel.
- 10) Accident Prevention Measures This column is for establishing recommended preventive measures to eliminate or control identified hazardous conditions and/or potential accidents. Preventive measures to be recommended should fall into the following categories:

hardware design requirements incorporation of safety devices hardware design changes special procedures personnel requirements

11) Validation - This column is provided to record validated preventive measures and keep cognizant of the status of the remaining recommended preventive measures. This column should be completed by answering two questions: 1) has the recommended solution been incorporated, and 2) is the solution effective?

In filling out the columnar PHA form, the dynamic relationship between the entries should be kept in mind. This relationship is depicted in Figure 3-6. The hazardous element (i.e., propellant) must be acted upon or influenced by some (discrete) event or condition (i.e., static electricity) in order for it to become a hazardous condition. Then, when the hazardous condition exists, it must be acted upon by some event or condition in order for it to result in the potential accident. In addition to an event or condition, duration may be a factor in causing the hazardous condition to result in the potential accident. That is, in certain cases, if the hazardous condition is allowed to exist without immediate corrective action, it may result in the potential accident without any other event acting upon it.




Figure 3-6 Relationship of Events Leading to an Accident

It should be noted that the information to go on the columnar form may not always be clear-cut or readily obvious. It is likely that, in some cases, special exceptions and deviations will be necessary. In some instances it will be found that the "cause event of the hazardous condition" is the same as the "cause event of the potential accident," except that the former is passive (a threat), whereas the latter is active (the threat being carried out).

3.5 When Performed

The PHA is generally started during the conceptual stage of program development. Then, as design development progresses, the PHA is iteratively updated in order that necessary safety design requirements can be established prior to each phase of more detailed design development.

Figure 3-7 shows a breakdown of the life cycle of a system and the corresponding PHA time relationship. As indicated, the initial PHA is performed during concept formulation. The PHA is then iteratively updated during contract definition and engineering development. It must be noted that this represents an ideal safety program, and that, in reality, strategic adjustments must always be made to suit the real-life requirements of the program.




Figure 3-7 System Life Cycle

3.6 Data Required

As is the case with most analyses, the PHA is performed by utilizing whatever data is available. At the conceptual phase, the following data is essential, customer requirements and specifications (when an RFP is available), conceptual drawings, block diagrams, conceptual procedures, and conceptual trade studies. As design development progresses, more detailed data is used as it becomes available.

4.0 EXAMPLE

Figure 4-1 presents a partial example of a PHA performed on a missile subsystem. One example of a hazardous element in the missile has been identified as an ordnance device. More appropriately, the hazardous element in this case is the ordnance explosive(s) in the device. The system modes affected by this hazardous element have been identified as: transportation, handling, storage, installation, test, and operation.

Values endangered by including this hazardous element in the system environment are: personned property, and/or the mission. The potential accident that risks these items of value is an "inadvertent ignition" of the hazardous element - ordnance explosive(s). Thus, the hazardous condition is established as "explosives exposed to an ignition environment." That is, the hazardous element - explosives - is placed in an environment where it is highly susceptible to premature or inadvertent ignition. The undesired triggering events which could cause the existence of the hazardous condition to become the potential accident are then shown to include: premature signals, erroneous commands, RFI, EMP, EMI, excessive temperature, shock, and electrical misconnection. In this instance, neither the hazardous element nor the ignition environment can be eliminated from the system. Such being the case, the hazardous condition cannot be eliminated. Therefore, control measures must be incorporated which reduce the risk of potential accident occurrence.

From a cursory look at this inductive analysis, five initial hardware safety requirements could be established, as follows:

- 1) no single or common failure mode shall both arm and ignite ordnance
- 2) use 1 amp 1 watt no fire EED's
- 3) use shielded wires
- 4) design electrical connectors to preclude misconnection
- 5) develop ordnance warning devices to indicate ordnance areas and to indicate "armed" and/or "safed" ordnance.

In the area of procedures, the need for special handling procedures and special bonding and grounding procedures would now have been established. The requirement for certified ordnance personnel would be identified as a personnel requirement. Applicable documents containing standards and requirements should be identified at this point.

It must be noted that this example is only for the purpose of familiarization and instruction and is, therefore, not entirely complete.

Figure 4-2 is an example of a PHA performed on a propulsion subsystem, where hydrazine is used as a fuel. Hydrazine, the hazardous element in this ease, is both an energy source and a toxicant. The completed form is self-explanatory and is performed similarly to the first example. Figure 4-3 is a further brief example.

- TIYA	DA TION	
ORE!	10A3 PERSONNEL	certified ordanses personnel
PREVENTION MEASURES	10A2 PROCEDURES	establish ord- nance handling procedures, foctoring emer- dures establish ade- quate bonding and grounding methods
10 ACCIDENT PREVI	ILANDWAPE	no single or common fallure mode shall both arm and ignite ordnance use I amp - I wait no fire EED's use shielded wires design electrical connectors to preclude possibility of misconnection develop warning devices to indicate armed and/or safed ordnance
ş HAZ.	CLASS 10A1	5 5 5 B2 B2 B2
9	EFFECT	tnjury to personnel damage to mission fallure
7 POTENTIAL	ACCIDENT	Inadversent ignition of explosive
6 EVENT CAUSING	ACCIDENT	premature ignition signal erroneous ignition command signal RFI EMP EMI excessive temperature abock electrical misconnection
SUCCESSIONS	CONDITION	explosive sub- jected to an ignition environ- meni
* EVENT CAUSING	HAZARDOU\$ CONDITION	inclusion of the explasive into the eyatem
HAZARDOUS	ELEMENT	equiosive
MODE		han- dilag storage storagi install.
A BSYSTER	PUNCTION	missile ordhance

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Figure 4-1

1 VA12 -	DATION		
11 44		4	
σπες	:caj Personnel	protective clating hydrazine tasting trains trains program	Eborn
PREVENTION MEASURES	10A2 PROCEDUMES	establish handding, storage and loading procedures develop emergency procedures through egress routes develop vapor detection procedures	BAILO 25 above
ACCIDENT	10A1 HARDWARE	use materials compatible with hydraxine use non-stalic producing materials label and identity fuel lines use vapor detector in operations develop warning devices to indicate hydraxine areas safety showers in area breathing apparatus in area	estine as above
HAZ.	CLASS 10A1	H 7 E 7 .	₽
8	EFFECI	injury to personnel damage to hardware/ equipment	injury to per sonnel
7 FOTENTAL	ACCIDENT	fire or explosion	exposure of personnel to toxic vapor
* EVENT CAUSING	POTENTAI. ACCIDENT	spart or flare spontaneous combustos hypergolte rescitos with actifa and oatilizers suchove 518°F vapor tgnittos shove 520°F	persomel is vicinity of unconfined by trazine
_	сомратом	bydrazine is exposed to oxidizer environ- ment	by drazine vapor
* EVENT CAUSING	MAZARDOUS CONNTION	kakago apill rupiura	batuge apill rupture
	FLEMENT	bydras ine	
2		Auto of Jailb - and	٠, ١
SUBSTREE OF	PUNCTION	propulation system	

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Figure 4-2

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11 VALI	NCTAG				•	· .		
URSI	10A3 PERSONNEL		Anna and a second se					
PREVENTION MEASORS!	10A2 PROCEDURES	sampooud Lonaliama qeijqaisa		·				
10 ACCIDENT PREV	10A1 HARDWARE	design system such that personnel and critical equipment are isolated from pressure tank hoortootate oresaure	relief device into design pressure indicators should be utilized tank must be proof		·			
PHAZ.	CIASS	III or IV	H Z	H B				
	Thirt	Injury to personnel	damage to critical equip- ment	fallure of systems de- pending upon tank pressure				
POTENTAL	ACCIDENT	contact of personnel with gas, pressure and debris	contact of critical equip- ment with gas, pressure and debris	loss of vank preseure				·
EVENT CAUSING	POTENTIAL	personnel in vicinity of uncontrolled pressure relief	critical equipment in a vicinity of uncontrolled pressure	no replacement loss of tank or repair, due preseure to insufficient time or non-maintainable				
S HAZARDOUS	сомргтюм	uncontrolled pressure rellef						
* EVENT CAUSING	HAZARDOUS CONDITION	over pressure of tark from thermal expansion or hardware	manufacturing deficiency structural damage of					•
3 HAZARDOUS	ELEMENT	compressed gan						
2 MODE		normsi upera- tion			:			•
i bubaysten ob	FUNCTION	pressure			•		•	

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Figure 4-3

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11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES Preliminary	12. SPONSORING MILIT	ARY AC	TIVITY			
Hazard Analysis also commonly referred to as a Gross Hazard Analysis	nil					
This document describes the method for performing a Preliminary Hazard Analysis (also known as a Gross Hazard Analysis) and using the derived results. This analysis is a method for identifying hazardous elements, hazardous conditions, and potential accidents; determining the significance of their potential effect; and establishing initial design and procedural safety requirements to eliminate or control these identified hazardous conditions and potential accidents. The data and information thereby derived can be used to serve other initial system safety needs, such as prediction, planning, and priority allocation.						

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